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“[T]hose who try to formulate substantive principles of justice 
should reserve a prominent place for human dignity. If this is not done, 
the distinctively moral aspects of justice will be absent; and the claims 
of justice will be at best legalistic and at worst arbitrary.”1  
 
In Henry v. Hulett,2 Delores Henry represented a certified class of 
approximately 200 convicted women at Lincoln Correctional Facility 
in Illinois who were strip searched as part of a “training exercise” for 
cadet guards.3 The facts of the case were summarized by the district 
and court of appeals this way: 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2021, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., May 2018, Political Science, University of Texas at Dallas. 
Thanks, Mom. 
1
 Michael S. Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299, 300-01 
(1972). 
2
 930 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 2019).  
3
 Id. at 841.  
1
Arnold: Unreasonable: Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit, & the Deter
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019




[Plaintiffs] were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to 
shoulder with 8-10 other inmates in a room where they could 
be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male 
officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their tampons 
and sanitary pads in front of others, were not given 
replacements, and many got blood on their bodies and 
clothing and blood on the floor. The naked inmates had to 
stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise 
their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread 
their buttocks and vaginas, and cough.4  
 
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit majority, held 
there was no fourth amendment violation because inmates have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy against any visual inspection.5 In 
other words, according to the Seventh Circuit, the fourth amendment 
can only be violated when prison guards physically penetrate 
prisoner’s bodies.6 
                                                 
4
 Id. at 837. 
5
 Id.; see id. at 838 (“The Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual 
inspections of convicted prisoners but does apply to procedures that entail intrusions 
within prisoners' bodies.”). Judge Manion joined in the majority. Judge Lee issued a 
dissenting opinion.  
6
 Plaintiffs brought a section 1983 claim under the eighth and fourth 
Amendments. Id. at 837. The district court awarded summary judgment to the 
defendants on the fourth amendment, holding the claim was only proper under the 
eighth amendment, given Seventh Circuit precedent “that a visual inspection of a 
convicted prisoner is not subject to analysis under [the fourth amendment].” Id. At 
trial, a jury returned a verdict for the defendants on eighth amendment grounds, 
which plaintiffs did not contest in their appeal before the Seventh Circuit. Id. Rather, 
the plaintiffs solely sought reinstatement of the fourth amendment claim, which was 
precluded from jury consideration. Id. As such, this paper addresses only the fourth 
amendment claim.  
2
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The Hulett majority opinion not only got the law wrong, it also 
got the policy wrong.7 Prisoners are particularly vulnerable to sexual 
violence.8 Prisons in the United States are run with almost no oversite 
and transparency. As such, the State of Illinois has no state official 
outside of the Department of Corrections that acts as an independent 
ombudsperson to jails and prisons within the state. The only protection 
against neglect and abuse by the Department of Corrections is through 
the court. When the Seventh Circuit categorically denied that 
protection, it denied prisoners their basic human dignity as well.  
This paper will argue the Seventh Circuit erred when it upheld the 
district court decision granting summary judgment for the defendant 
due to a failure to state a fourth amendment claim.9  In writing for the 
majority, Judge Easterbrook relied on flawed reasoning and dubious 
precedent to conclude the fourth amendment does not protect 
convicted prisoners from visual inspections, regardless of whether 
they are overly intrusive10 or unnecessary,11 leaving bodily intrusions 
by prison guards as the only possible claim for fourth amendment 
protection.12 
Section I of this paper will briefly discuss the history of the fourth 
amendment and its protections for prisoners. Section II will review the 
Seventh Circuit’s previous decisions on the matter, demonstrating the 
erosion of constitutional protections for the incarcerated. Section III 
                                                 
7
 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 540 (1984) (holding an inmate had no 
privacy interest in his cell where a prison guard ripped the inmate’s pillowcase 
during a search and the inmate filed suit).  
8
 See NAT'L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM'N, National Prison Rape 
Elimination Commission Report, 33, (2009), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf. 
9
 Thogmorton v. Reynolds, 12-CV-3087, 2016 WL 11265636, at *18 (C.D. Ill. 
Apr. 14, 2016). 
10
 As are the facts of this case.  
11
 “This mass strip search of female inmates was conducted solely for training 
purposes, but the training was not strictly necessary, as most cadets graduated 
without it.” Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2019) (Lee, J., dissenting) 
(internal citations omitted).  
12
 Judge Easterbrook relies on cases written by Judge Easterbrook: Johnson v. 
Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995); King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). 
3
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4 
will discuss the concept of dignity as a guide courts should use to 
better protect the fourth amendment rights of all people, particularly 
convicted prisoners.  
 
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR PRISONERS 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . .  .”13  
 
Generally, the fourth amendment protects the right of the people 
“against unreasonable searches and seizures.”14 It ordinarily requires 
the government to obtain a warrant for a search, probable cause for an 
arrest, and reasonable suspicion for a patdown.15 However, if the target 
of the search is incarcerated, broad deference is granted to guards and 
the prison system—and there may be no protection at all.16 
Courts justify limiting rights of offenders in two primary ways. 
First, by recognizing the practical issues inherent in prisons.17 These 
include danger, order, discipline, efficiency, and complexity.18 Second, 
where rights may be constitutionally limited by due process of law.19 
At the intersection of practical and constitutional considerations is the 
                                                 
13
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
14
 Id.  
15
 For example, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961) (holding the 
exclusionary rule applies to bar evidence obtained through searches conducted 
without probable cause); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (holding 
arresting officials had probable cause to believe that petitioner was violating federal 
narcotic laws and their search was incident to a lawful arrest where an informant's tip 
was independently corroborated); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968) (holding no 
fourth amendment violation where an officer had reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was about to commit robbery, and made a "stop and frisk" warrantless 
intrusion that yielded a weapon).  
16
 Such was the holding in Henry, 930 F.3d at 838. 
17
 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527–28 (1984).  
18
 Id.  
19
 Id.   
4
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5 
unreasonableness standard within the language of the fourth 
amendment. This paper will look to past decisions, as well as 
considerations for good policy in trying to determine when a search 
is—and should be—unreasonable, and why the decision of the 
Seventh Circuit in Hulett was exactly that, unreasonable.  
 
A. History of the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court 
 
Throughout much of United States history, courts generally did 
not recognize fourth amendment protections for prisoners.20 In the 19th 
century, convicted prisoners were considered “slaves of the state.”21 
Even as courts moved away from the language of slavery, the Supreme 
Court continued to deny Constitutional rights to prisoners. In 1962, the 
Court ruled in Lanza v. State of New York that a jail is inherently 
different from other settings where privacy within the fourth 
amendment applies, reasoning that “official surveillance has 
traditionally been the order of the day.”22  
Just five years after Lanza, the Court decided the landmark case 
Katz v. United States.23 Katz gives us the expectation of privacy test, 
used to determine whether a search has occurred, and whether that 
search was reasonable.24 Under the Katz test, a fourth amendment 
“search” has occurred where (1) someone “exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and  (2) “the expectation [is] one 
                                                 
20
 See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 22 (1919) (holding no fourth 
amendment violation occurred where letters by an inmate were intercepted by prison 
officials and used against him in a criminal case, reasoning that taking the letters was 
“reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution”). 
21
 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).  
22
 Lanza v. State of N.Y., 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962) (“a jail shares none of 
the attributes of privacy of a home, automobile, an office, or a hotel room.”) 
23
 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
24
 Id. But see William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal 
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017–18 (1995) (“The idea that the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments guarantee broad privacy protection dates back at least to Boyd v. 
United States, an 1886 Supreme Court decision that laid the foundation for modern 
search and seizure and self-incrimination doctrine.”)  
5
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that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”25 If both prongs 
of Katz are met, a warrant is required, “subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”26 
Even as Katz expanded fourth amendment protections, courts 
continued to find no expectation of privacy for prisoners.27 Eventually, 
cracks in this line of anti-prisoner’s rights jurisprudence started to 
appear, and the Supreme Court became more willing to hear cases and 
protect the rights of prisoners.28 Finally, in 1974, a unanimous 
Supreme Court proclaimed “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between 
the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”29 
 
By 1979, the Supreme Court was ready to take up the issue of 
visual body cavity searches in Bell v. Wolfish.30 The court considered 
                                                 
25
 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan’s two-prong test was 
eventually affirmed by a majority of the Court. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740 (1979); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-215 (1986).  
26
 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  
27
 See State v. Brotherton, 465 P.2d 749, 751 (1970) (holding that a search 
warrant was not necessary to obtain letters from a prisoner in order to use them as 
evidence in his criminal trial because “prison authorities may subject inmates to 
institutional searches unimpeded by Fourth Amendment barriers”) (references 
omitted). But see Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the 
Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA.L.REV. 1045, 1060 (1976) 
(stating “[t]he flaw in the [Katz] subjective approach is obvious. If a person knows 
he will be searched, he cannot claim that he expected privacy. By announcing a 
policy of continuous surveillance, thereby eliminating any subjective expectation of 
privacy, correctional officials could define the scope of an inmate's fourth 
amendment rights”). 
28
 See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (holding invidious racial 
discrimination is as intolerable within a prison as outside, except as may be essential 
to "prison security and discipline”); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489 (1969) 
(holding prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the Government for 
redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts). 
29
 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (“though his rights may 
be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a 
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned 
for crime.”) 
30
 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
6
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7 
the legitimate interests of both the government and the prisoners.31 
While this decision ultimately came out against the plaintiff prisoners, 
the Court explicitly stated searches of this kind that are found to be 
unreasonable or abusive must not be condoned.32 Justice Rehnquist 
wrote the majority opinion for the court. The following excerpt is 
particularly enlightening:  
 
We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches 
may invade the personal privacy of inmates. Nor do we 
doubt, as the District Court noted, that on occasion a security 
guard may conduct the search in an abusive fashion. Such an 
abuse cannot be condoned. The searches must be conducted 
in a reasonable manner. But we deal here with the question 
whether visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by 
the MCC rules can ever be conducted on less than probable 
cause. Balancing the significant and legitimate security 
interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the 
inmates, we conclude that they can.33  
 
The Seventh Circuit majority in Henry mentioned Wolfish as 
proof for their assertion that “strip searches often are reasonable and 
thus permissible.”34 They ignored entirely “[b]alancing the significant 
and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy 
interests of the inmates.”35 
                                                 
31
 Id. at 560.  
32
 Id.  
33
 Id.  
34
 Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 2019). 
35
 Bell v. Wolfish at 560.  
7
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1. Hudson v. Palmer: Flawed, Inconsistent, Controlling  
 
“We hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to a 
prison cell.”36 
 
“The reasoning . . . of the Court's opinion, however, is seriously 
flawed—indeed, internally inconsistent.”37 
 
In 1984, Hudson v. Palmer quoted Bell v. Wolfish, stating “[w]e 
believe that it is accepted by our society that ‘[l]oss of freedom of 
choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.’”38 Hudson 
was a civil action brought by a prisoner, Russell Palmer, under section 
1983 against a prison officer, Ted Hudson.39 Officer Hudson found a 
ripped pillowcase in Palmer’s trashcan.40 Palmer was charged and 
convicted for destruction of state property regarding the pillowcase.41 
The civil suit alleged Officer Hudson conducted an unreasonable 
“shakedown” search of Palmer’s cell.42  
 
The Hudson majority stated, “of course, intentional harassment of 
even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized 
society.”43 This was just a short distance away from the Court’s claim 
that “curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to 
accommodate a myriad of ‘institutional needs and objectives’ of prison 
facilities.”44 The Hudson Court applied the Katz test to Officer 
                                                 
36
 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984).  
37
 Id. at 541–42 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
38
 Id., 468 U.S. at 528 (majority opinion). 
39
 Id. at 520. 
40
 Id.  
41
 Id.   
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. at 528.  
44
 Id. at 524.  
8
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Hudson’s actions.45 However, the Court included a balancing of 
interests analysis within its Katz test consideration, stating “[i]t would 
be literally impossible to accomplish [institutional security] if inmates 
retained a right of privacy in their cells.”46  
Writing for the four-vote dissent, Justice Stevens held no punches 
in a sharp criticism of the flawed majority opinion by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, even quoting a previous decision by the Chief Justice. 
“It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully 
confined, but they do not lose all civil rights.”47 Justice Stevens went 
on to state, “[the majority] holds that no matter how malicious, 
destructive, or arbitrary a cell search and seizure may be, it cannot 
constitute an unreasonable invasion of any privacy or possessory 
interest that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”48 Justice 
Stevens believed the majority erred in its failure to recognize the 
important value of privacy, even in residual amounts that “may mark 
the difference between slavery and humanity.”49 
Even with its flawed reasoning, neither the Hudson decision, nor 
any opinion of the Supreme Court since Hudson, demands the type of 
categorical denial of rights asserted by Judge Easterbrook in his 
majority opinion in Henry.50 In fact, no other circuit has allowed such 
an outcome.51 Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion in Henry does not 
                                                 
45
 “We must decide, in Justice Harlan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation 
of privacy in his prison cell is the kind of expectation that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.” Id., at 525 (internal quotations omitted).  
46
 Id., at 527. 
47
 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5, n. 2, (1978). 
48
 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 542.  
49
 Id.  
50
 Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Hudson did not 
consider whether convicted prisoners have some residual privacy interest in their 
persons, as opposed to their possessions and surroundings. The Justices have not 
returned to that subject in later decisions”); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
566 U.S. 318 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("The Court is nonetheless wise to 
leave open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we not 'embarrass the 
future.'") (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). 
51
 Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.1988) (“it was clearly 
established by 1984 that body cavity searches of inmates must be conducted in a 
9
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just depart from other circuits, it departs from decisions in the Seventh 
Circuit as well.52  
At this point one may wonder what in the world happened with 
the Henry decision. Afterall, Judge Easterbrook claimed the majority 
was only following precedent.53 I must now confess I have not yet 
addressed one particularly important circuit court decision: a case 
from the Seventh Circuit only one year after its decision in Canedy v. 
Boardman.  
 
II. EROSION IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
“My colleagues say that we must respect ‘the hard choices made 
by prison administrators.’ I agree. There is no basis in the record, 
however, for supposing that such a choice was made here.”54 
 
How did the Seventh Circuit come to a decision in Henry v. Hulett 
that is so different from how other circuit courts deal with this issue? It 
started with a clash in Johnson v. Phelan between Judge Easterbrook, 
for the majority, and Judge Posner, concurring in part and dissenting in 
                                                                                                                   
reasonable manner, and that issues of privacy, hygiene, and the training of those 
conducting the searches are relevant to determining whether the manner of search 
was reasonable”); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1992) (notwithstanding 
Hudson, “inmates do retain a limited right to bodily privacy”); Dunn v. White, 880 
F.2d 1188 (10th Cir.1989) (after Hudson, a “prisoner's privacy interest in the 
integrity of his own person is still preserved under Wolfish”); Spence v. Farrier, 807 
F.2d 753 (8th Cir.1986) (traditional Wolfish approach used re urinalysis); Levoy v. 
Mills, 788 F.2d 1437 (10th Cir.1986) (rejecting notion Hudson “eviscerates the 
requirement set forth in Wolfish that personal body searches of inmates must be 
reasonable under the circumstances”); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206 (4th 
Cir.2016) (“under Wolfish, prisoners retain an interest in some degree of bodily 
privacy and integrity after Hudson”). 
52
 In 1994, the Seventh Circuit. Decided Canedy v. Boardman.
52
, 16 F.3d 183 
(7th Cir.1994) (Hudson's abrogation of fourth amendment protections applies to 
prisoners' cells, not to prisoners themselves). 
53
 Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 2019).  
54
 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 156 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
10
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part.55 As with all of the cases Easterbrook relied on in writing the 
majority opinion in Henry, the facts of Johnson v. Phelan were 
inherently less offensive than the sexual trauma committed in Henry. 
Johnson, imprisoned at Cook County Jail, alleged “cross-sex 
monitoring in the Jail violated the due process clause.”56 In other 
words, Johnson was uncomfortable being monitored by female guards 
because they could see him naked in his cell, using the toilet, and in 
the shower.57  
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, began by looking to 
whether the monitoring was “unreasonable” under the fourth 
amendment.58 Rather than simply applying precedent to the relatively 
easy facts of the case before the court, Judge Easterbrook vastly 
overstated Supreme Court precedent, and sets the foundation to ignore 
all fourth amendment claims by convicted prisoners.59 Judge 
Easterbrook’s majority opinion explicitly claimed Hudson v. Palmer 
decided that prisoners retain no fourth amendment privacy rights.60 It 
goes on to justify its broad conclusion in a way that makes denial of 
fourth amendment protection in a case with more difficult facts—as in 
Henry v. Hulett—seem inevitable.61 “Inter-prisoner violence is 
endemic, so constant vigilance without regard to the state of the 
prisoners' dress is essential. Vigilance over showers, vigilance over 
cells—vigilance everywhere, which means that guards gaze upon 
naked inmates.”62 This justification uses the threat of violence, and the 
implied need of safety for prisoners (and staff), as a means to 
categorically deny legal claims against practices that can and do 
unnecessarily and unreasonably cause harm to prisoners.  
                                                 
55
 Id., 69 F.3d at 151. 
56
 Id. at 145 (majority opinion).  
57
 Id.  
58
 Id.  
59
 Id. at 146.  
60
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Judge Easterbrook explicitly asserted prisoners retain no right of 
privacy under the fourth amendment. Judge Easterbrook used 
Hudson—where the Court “h[e]ld that society is not prepared to 
recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a 
prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth 
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply 
within the confines of the prison cell”—to assert the end of all fourth 
amendment privacy protections for convicted prisoners.63 
Ultimately, what Judge Easterbrook did was take a line of cases—
with easier facts—to unnecessarily establish a broad rule; then applied 
it to a case which almost certainly would have come out differently 
under ordinary Constitutional interpretation. Hudson involved a 
routine “shakedown” of a prison cell where the inmate, Hudson, was 
disciplined after officers found a damaged pillowcase in the trashcan.64 
Hudson explicitly used the Katz expectation of privacy test and 
applied it to the specific facts of the case.65 
In Phelan, convicted prisoner Johnson felt uncomfortable being 
monitored by female guards as opposed to male guards where he 
would occasionally be nude in going about his day.66 Judge 
Easterbrook applied Hudson in Phelan, but never mentioned Katz. In 
fact, Judge Easterbrook applied no test for reasonableness at all.67 He 
incorrectly asserted that under Hudson, prisoners have no fourth 
amendment privacy rights, and moved on.68 
For his Phelan finale, Judge Easterbrook claimed that precedent 
protecting constitutional privacy of prisoners should be understood “as 
invocations of the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments.”69 Then within a few paragraphs, Judge Easterbrook 
                                                 
63
 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). 
64
 Id. at 519. 
65
 Id. at 525.  
66
 Johnson, 69 F.3d at 145. 
67
 A departure from the actual text of the fourth amendment that is worth 
noting for an originalist like Judge Easterbrook.  
68
 Johnson, 69 F.3d at 146.  
69
 Id. at 147.  
12
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opined about “[h]ow odd it would be to find in the eighth amendment 
a right” to privacy claimed in the case.70 Odd indeed, but 25 years later 
Judge Easterbrook believed it is precedent worth holding in Henry v. 
Hulett.71 
At the end of the Henry majority opinion, Judge Easterbrook 
noted “judges, including those within the Seventh Circuit, have 
disagreed about whether the fourth amendment ever prevents guards 
from viewing naked prisoners. Johnson was decided over a dissent.”72 
Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner is listed in the opinion as 
concurring and dissenting. Posner makes it immediately clear that his 
concurrence is in outcome only.73  
Posner began with a textbook legal pragmatist explanation of the 
Eighth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, describing it as “a 
Rorschach test. What the judge sees in it is the reflection of his or her 
own values, values shaped by personal experience and temperament as 
well as by historical reflection, public opinion, and other sources of 
moral judgment.”74 Posner went on to compare “privacy” and its 
different meanings under reproductive autonomy, tort law, right to 
confidentiality, and fourth amendment search and seizure. “The 
problem is that the term “right of privacy” bears meanings in law that 
are remote from its primary ordinary-language meaning, which 
happens to be the meaning that a suit of this sort invokes.”75 
                                                 
70
 Id. at 148.  
71
 “Plaintiffs ask us to overrule Johnson and King to the extent that they deem 
the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to visual inspections of convicted prisoners. We 
decline.” Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 2019).  
72
 Id. at 839.  
73
 “I agree with the district judge and my colleagues that Johnson's equal 
protection claim has no possible merit, that there is no possible basis for imputing 
liability to the president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, and that the 
claims against the defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed as 
unauthorized suits against the State of Illinois. That is where my agreement ends.” 
Johnson, 69 F.3d at 151. 
74
 Id. at 151. Posner addresses the eighth amendment issue first but goes on to 
the fourth amendment.   
75
 Id., at 152 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
13
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It is interesting to note the Seventh Circuit decided Johnson v. 
Phelan only one year after their decision in Canedy v. Boardman.76 In 
Canedy, the court stated “[i]nmates surely do not enjoy the full sweep 
of constitutional rights afforded other members of society. But even 
so, those who are convicted of criminal offenses do not surrender all 
of their constitutional rights.”77 
Judge Easterbrook responded to the question of Canedy by first 
differentiating cases involving “visual rather than tactile 
inspections.”78 Expanding on that, Judge Easterbrook stated “[w]e 
therefore think it best to understand the references to “privacy” in 
Canedy and similar cases as invocations of the eighth amendment's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishments.”79 Judge Easterbrook moved 
privacy protections from the fourth amendment, which demands a 
reasonableness standard, to the eighth amendment, which has no such 
demand. If one wanted to eliminate privacy protections, this is how 
you would do it. However, it still flies in the face of Supreme Court 
precedent. “Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded those 
rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or 
incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.”80 
When it comes to the question of visual verses tactile inspections 
in Henry, there appears to be no way around fourth amendment 
protections against bodily intrusion.81 Judge Easterbrook recognized as 
much in his majority opinion for Peckham v. Wisconsin Department of 
                                                 
76
 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994). Notably, Judge Easterbrook was not a 
participant in this case, which does not categorically deny fourth amendment rights 
as later decisions written by Easterbrook would do.   
77
 Id., at 185. 
78
 Johnson, 69 F.3d at 145. 
79
 Id. at 147. 
80
 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984).  
81
 Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Certainly Hudson does 
not establish that the interior of one's body is as open to invasion as the interior of 
one's cell”); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendants in case challenging requirement that prisoner produce urine 
for drug test, but noting that "inmates retain protected privacy rights in their 
bodies"). 
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
15 
Corrections.82 “[O]f course the fourth amendment ‘applies’ inside the 
nation's prisons.”83 Judge Easterbrook reasoned “surgical invasions of 
a person's body in search of evidence must be objectively reasonable,” 
because the “fourth amendment interest in bodily integrity . . . does 
not vanish with conviction and imprisonment.”84 However, Judge 
Easterbrook doubles down on the notion that places that can hide 
weapons (cells, pockets, under clothes) retain no privacy protection in 
prison.85 
With this long history in mind, Judge Easterbrook’s majority 
opinion in Henry appears inevitable. Judge Easterbrook had been 
building up to this case for so long, laying the foundation in the easier 
cases and building up the precedent. Then when the court gets to 
Henry, Judge Easterbrook throws his hands up and exclaims there is 
nothing he can do; he is bound by this court. He quoted his own 
previous cases, stating “we should recognize that the Fourth 
Amendment's focus on objective reasonableness may preserve some 
outer limit on the actions of even well-meaning prison administrators 
where such bodily searches are involved, while it also requires courts 
to give substantial—but not complete—deference to the warden's 
judgment.”86 Judge Easterbrook then invited us to compare that with 
his majority opinion in Johnson v. Phelan, and his concurrence in King 
v. McCarty, “hold[ing] that a visual inspection of a convicted prisoner 
is not subject to analysis under that amendment.”87 
Judge Easterbrook ended the majority opinion in Henry by 
claiming “[f]or more than 20 years it has been established in this 
circuit that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual inspections 
                                                 
82
 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998).  
83
 Id. at 699.  
84
 Id.  
85
 Id. See also Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (Judge 
Easterbrook concurring) (prisoners' privacy interests "are extinguished by judgments 
placing them in custody"). 
86
 Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 2019) quoting King v. McCarty, 
781 F.3d 889, 904 (7th Cir. 2015).  
87
 Id., at 837. 
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of prisoners.”88 This statement is only partially correct. It has certainly 
been established in opinions of Judge Easterbrook. But it is far from 
established in the Seventh Circuit. The back and forth over that time 
regarding fourth amendment protections for prisoners demonstrates, at 
best, Judge Easterbrook’s preference, and, at worst, the complete 
failure to establish the visual inspection rule in the Seventh Circuit. 
Which is totally aside from the fact that no other Circuit has imposed a 
similarly harsh rule. 
It would be easy at this point to say that Judge Easterbrook simply 
got the law wrong. But there is something inherently problematic with 
the fourth amendment precedent. And it has a lot to do with that 
central unenumerated protection: privacy. It is really with the creative 
view on privacy in the first case—Phelan—where it all goes awry. In 
fact, Chief Judge Posner recognized the issue in his dissent.  
 
The parties have confused the first issue by describing 
it as the extent of a prisoner's “right of privacy.” They 
cannot be criticized too harshly for this. Countless 
cases, including our own Canedy v. Boardman, have 
done the same thing. The problem is that the term 
“right of privacy” bears meanings in law that are 
remote from its primary ordinary-language meaning, 
which happens to be the meaning that a suit of this sort 
invokes. One thing it means in law is the right to 
reproductive autonomy; another is a congeries of tort 
rights only one of which relates to the naked body; still 
another is the right to maintain the confidentiality of 
certain documents and conversations. Another and 
overlapping meaning is the set of interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures.89 
 
                                                 
88
 Id. at 839.  
89
 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted). 
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It is time to recognize human dignity as a right, guaranteed by the 
fourth amendment.  
 
III. DIGNITY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
“Although privacy may have been a promising theory of the 
Fourth Amendment at one time, it has now lost much of its luster and 
utility. The Court has interpreted privacy to be a question of fact rather 
than a constitutional value.”90 
 
The quote above provides some insight into how the Seventh 
Circuit got to this point. Judge Easterbrook is a smart and influential 
jurist; respected and revered in the legal community for decades. I am 
a second-year law student, writing a paper, calling him out for getting 
the law wrong. But my claim is not that simple. Judge Easterbrook’s 
majority opinion in Henry v. Hulett stated it was merely following 
Seventh Circuit precedent. That is true. And while I have called that 
precedent into question—for exaggerating Supreme Court precedent, 
making logical leaps, and being written by the same Judge—that does 
not mean it is not precedent. That is how our system works. Bad 
precedent begets bad precedent. Categorical denials of constitutionally 
protected rights become just another day at the office. In that way, 
injustice becomes collateral damage of a system that lacks foresight 
but demands adherence.  
What I am trying to say is Judge Easterbrook, along with the 
judges that joined his majority opinions, ruled within the scope of the 
law as it existed. When few were looking and fewer cared, Judge 
Easterbrook eliminated fourth amendment protections for convicted 
prisoners.91 He was able to do this because he reasoned that convicted 
prisoners necessarily give up their privacy in the prison setting.92 A 
                                                 
90
 Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 825 (1999).  
91
 Johnson, 69 F.3d at 150 (“The fourth amendment does not protect privacy 
interests within prisons.”) 
92
 Id., at 146 (“privacy is the thing most surely extinguished by a judgment 
committing someone to prison.”) 
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strip search of convicted prisoners is always reasonable, according to 
Judge Easterbrook.93 Injustice is not considered. Humanity is not 
considered. Dignity is not considered. And therein lies the rub; Judge 
Easterbrook’s Seventh Circuit precedent demands unjust outcomes. 
The facts of Henry v. Hulett demonstrate this injustice. In fact, there 
are more to the facts than mentioned on the first page of this paper. 
That block quote was generously pulled from the majority opinion and 
left out additional facts recognized by the dissent. “The female 
correctional officers and cadets conducting the searches made 
derogatory comments and gestures about the women’s bodies and 
odors, telling the women that they were ‘dirty bitches,’ ‘fucking 
disgusting,’ ‘deserve to be in here,’ and ‘smell like death.’ Male 
correctional officers watched the women from the gym.”94  
The dissent did not have access to facts not available to the 
majority. Judges Easterbrook and Manion read these and all the facts 
of the case, then they signed their names to the majority opinion. “The 
most one can say for plaintiffs is that judges, including those within 
the Seventh Circuit, have disagreed about whether the fourth 
amendment ever prevents guards from viewing naked prisoners.”95 If 
that’s the most one can say, the fourth amendment is not worth the 
paper it’s written on.  
The word “privacy” never appears in the text of the Constitution. 
Certain privacy rights are recognized by courts as constitutionally 
guaranteed, particularly within the fourth amendment. But privacy 
alone cannot protect the necessary entirety of the fourth amendment. 
“Searches and seizures can and often do cause injuries that are simply 
not cognizable to a regime predicated solely upon privacy.”96 The right 
                                                 
93
 Henry v. Hulett, 930 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2019) (“For more than 20 years 
it has been established in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
visual inspections of prisoners. It is best to leave the law of the circuit alone, unless 
and until the Justices suggest that it needs change.”) 
94
 Henry v. Hulett 841 (7th Cir. 2019) (Judge Lee dissenting) (internal citation 
omitted). 
95
 Id., at 839 (majority opinion). 
96
 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 
WIS. L. REV. 655, 708 (2008). 
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to human dignity must be recognized alongside the right to privacy. 
“Even if one has no privacy, liberty, or property, or the legitimate 
expectation of the same, such as is the case with a prisoner, there 
remains a core human right to be free of government action that 
unreasonably or unnecessarily strips one of his dignity or intrinsic 
humanity.”97 fourth amendment dignity protections would trigger 
when a search or seizure violates individual dignity in a way that is 
objectively unreasonable. Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion in 
Henry v. Hulett demonstrates the inadequacy of privacy as the sole 
basis for fourth amendment protection. Formal recognition of dignity 
within the fourth amendment would help to ensure just outcomes. 
The concept of dignity is not new to the Constitution.98 The 
following quote from Justice Kennedy recognizes the important 
constitutional role of dignity.99 
 
Over time, from one generation to the next, the 
Constitution has come to earn the high respect and 
even, as Madison dared to hope, the veneration of the 
American people. The document sets forth, and rests 
upon, innovative principles original to the American 
experience, such as federalism; a proven balance in 
political mechanisms through separation of powers; 
specific guarantees for the accused in criminal cases; 
                                                 
97
 Id., at 675. 
98
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices for us to 
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of 
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (“The basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man”); Planned 
Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These matters, involving 
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 713(1998) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This Court has often found, for example, that the privilege 
[against self-incrimination] recognizes the unseemliness, the insult to human dignity, 
created when a person must convict himself out of his own mouth.”). 
99
 Here in the context of an Eighth Amendment case.  
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and broad provisions to secure individual freedom and 
preserve human dignity.100 
 
The prison setting is particularly susceptible to violations of 
dignity. If the Supreme Court has already stated “[t]here is no iron 
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
country,” why then would we allow prisons to unreasonably violate 
the dignity of prisoners?101 Maybe if Judge Easterbrook had to answer 
that question, Henry v. Hulett would have come out different.  
In the end, some 200 women at Lincoln Correctional Center were 
victims of sexual trauma. They went to court seeking justice and found 
none.  
 
“We must not exaggerate the distance between ‘us,’ the lawful 
ones, the respectable ones, and the prison and jail population; for 
such exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny that population 
the rudiments of humane consideration.”102 
 
                                                 
100
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (internal citations omitted).  
101
 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (“though his rights may 
be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a 
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned 
for crime.”) 
102
 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
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